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96 N.C. L. REV. 1203 (2018)

ALL THINGS IN AGGREGATION:
REASSESSING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S
THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AND THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO CELL SITE
LOCATION INFORMATION IN UNITED STATES
V. GRAHAM*
INTRODUCTION
When technology and the law clash with one another, which
wins? The measured, deliberate pace of the legal field and the often
breathtakingly rapid evolution of the technological world stand in
stark contrast with one another and have produced a multitude of
fascinating conflicts and debates with few clear and easy answers.
Applying long-standing doctrines from the age before computers to
the modern world of smartphones is sometimes seamless but, in many
cases, raises significant questions around the continued applicability
of these doctrines. Finding answers to these questions is thus a vital
task.
This struggle between rights and technology lies at the heart of
United States v. Graham,1 a recent Fourth Circuit case that
deliberated the nature and extent of the Fourth Amendment’s
protection of cell site location information (“CSLI”).2 CSLI indicates
the cell tower closest to a cell phone user when that user makes or
receives calls and sends or receives texts, essentially creating a piece
of information that details the time and place that a person makes a
call or sends a text.3 In Graham, CSLI collected from cell phone
providers without a warrant was used to determine and track the

* © 2018 James G. McLeod.
1. 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
2. Id. at 424.
3. See Robinson Meyer, This Very Common Cellphone Surveillance Still Doesn’t
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
14,
2016),
Require
a
Warrant,
THE
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/sixth-circuit-cellphone-tracking-csliwarrant/478197/ [https://perma.cc/FC8P-ZSCE]. Historical CSLI, which is the type of data at
issue in Graham, is created when law enforcement requests CSLI that has been generated
by a particular phone. Id. In 2015, AT&T handled more than 58,000 requests for this
historical CSLI. Id.
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defendants’ locations during a string of robberies.4 The Graham court
followed other recent circuit court decisions5 by holding that law
enforcement did not need to acquire a warrant for this information
under the third-party doctrine,6 a principle stating that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect information individuals “voluntarily
turn[] over to third parties.”7
The Graham court’s decision raised important questions about
the conflict between privacy and a number of Fourth Amendment
doctrines, including the third-party doctrine, in today’s technologydriven world. Significantly, during its examination of these conflicts,
the Graham court dismissed an argument by the defendants regarding
the dangers of the aggregation of CSLI data to determine a
defendant’s location and track that defendant’s detailed movements
over a lengthy period of time.8 To defendants, this tracking enabled
by the aggregation of CSLI was the functional equivalent of longterm GPS tracking without a warrant, which is barred by the Fourth
Amendment.9 This aggregation could also raise serious privacy
concerns.10 In addition to dismissing this argument, the court further
stated that the defendants improperly attempted to distinguish
constitutionally protected “content” of communications (i.e., private
data such as the contents of letters or the conversation of a phone
call)11 from unprotected “non-content” (i.e., the addressing
information from letters or packages),12 meaning that the court
4. Id.
5. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that
several months of CSLI data gathered from defendants’ wireless carriers was not
protected because it was not content and the gathering from a third party “can only
diminish the defendants’ expectation of privacy in the information those records
contain”), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). Carpenter, which dealt with the gathering
of CSLI information after several armed robberies throughout the Detroit area, see id. at
884–85, has, at the time of this writing, been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. See
also, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 517–18 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that the
defendant had “no reasonable expectation of privacy in business records made, kept, and
owned by” a cell service provider); In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600,
610–12, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (deciding that the voluntarily-given CSLI is not protected since
“it is established that, when a person communicates information to a third party even on
the understanding that the communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third party
conveys that information”).
6. Graham, 824 F.3d at 437–38.
7. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
8. Graham, 824 F.3d at 433–34.
9. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
10. See id. at 415–16.
11. Graham, 824 F.3d at 433.
12. Graham, 824 F.3d at 433.
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essentially stripped all non-content third-party data—no matter how
sensitive or revealing in the aggregate—of constitutional
protections.13 The lack of a boundary in this area is troublesome
because a properly considered limit could resolve some of the
significant fears and criticisms surrounding the third-party doctrine,14
especially in light of the ever-evolving technologies of the modern
age. Without such a limit, the government could theoretically, without
the probable cause required for a warrant, obtain data from
multitudes of third-party actors who collect various pieces of
information about citizens in order to build an intimate, detailed
picture of one’s health, travels, finances, sleep schedules, contacts,
internet history, purchases, and more. At this point, would the
government even need a warrant?
These troubles may have been on the Supreme Court Justices’
minds when they granted certiorari in the Sixth Circuit case United
States v. Carpenter,15 a CSLI case with many of the same concerns as
Graham.16 Regardless of how the Court holds, crafting a doctrine that
attempts to grapple with the evolution of technology will be a difficult
task. In response to the Graham decision and the debates surrounding
the third-party doctrine and the Fourth Amendment, this Recent
Development analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s holding regarding the
aggregation of CSLI data and discusses the potential consequences, as
well as the potential remedies to these consequences.
This Recent Development’s analysis proceeds in four parts. Part
I provides the background of the Graham decision. Part II examines
13. See id. at 433–36 (“If individuals lack any legitimate expectation of privacy in
information they share with a third party, then sharing more non-private information with
that third party cannot change the calculus.”).
14. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Orin S. Kerr, The Case
for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 570–73 (2009) (“If third-party
services play a growing role in government surveillance, the concern runs, then the Fourth
Amendment will regulate a smaller and smaller portion of that surveillance; the
government will be able to collect and assemble ‘digital dossier’ without Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. To ensure sufficient constitutional protection online, many argue,
the third-party cases should be overruled or sharply limited to their facts.”).
15. 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017).
16. Compare Graham, 824 F.3d at 425 (holding that the CSLI data gathered by police
was properly gathered without a warrant because the “Court has long held that an
individual enjoys no Fourth Amendment protection ‘in information he voluntarily turns
over to [a] third part[y]’” (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
743–44 (1979))), with United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016)
(discussing the acquisition of CSLI information by the police in a robbery case, as well as
defendant’s arguments that this acquisition violated the Fourth Amendment because the
police did not acquire a search warrant), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017).
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the third-party doctrine and how the Fourth and other circuits’
decisions in cases regarding CSLI fit within this doctrine. Part III
explores some of the potential ramifications of the Graham decision.
Part IV proposes a different approach to the aggregation of noncontent under the third-party doctrine based upon an individual’s
reasonable assumptions regarding how data will be used.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES V. GRAHAM
On January 17, 2011, Aaron Graham robbed a Dollar Tree near
Baltimore, Maryland at gunpoint.17 This robbery was the first in a
string of six armed robberies carried out over several weeks by
Graham and a number of others throughout the Baltimore area that
ended only when Graham and Eric Jordan (a fellow defendant) were
apprehended after a police chase.18 During the post-arrest
investigation, the police were able to connect the defendants to the
crime scenes through photographic evidence, eyewitness accounts
that matched clothing worn by robbers at the crime scene with
clothing found in a defendant’s home and on their persons, and
descriptions of the defendants’ vehicle.19 After carrying out these
searches in the defendants’ residences—searches conducted pursuant
to search warrants—the government obtained two non-warrant court
orders for “disclosure of CSLI for calls and text messages” for 221
days from both defendants’ phones.20 The defendants protested this
action, arguing that the government violated the Fourth Amendment
“in seeking and inspecting the CSLI at issue here without a warrant
based on probable cause.”21 The Fourth Circuit, upon its initial
consideration, agreed with the defendants’ assertion that this
gathering of CSLI was an unreasonable search, but it upheld the
conviction because of the government’s good faith reliance on the
controlling statute, the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).22

17. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’d on other grounds,
824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
18. Id. at 339–40.
19. Id. at 340–41, 374.
20. Id. at 340–41.
21. Id. at 344.
22. Id. at 343. Evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not
automatically prohibited in court. Instead, this evidence is subject to the “exclusionary
rule,” which bars evidence only when “the benefits of deterrence [of future violations]
outweigh the costs of suppression.” Id. at 361. This test depends on the culpability of the
government’s conduct, which was not sufficient to bar the evidence here due to the
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The SCA, which provides a mechanism for the government to
procure records or information pertaining to electronic
communications,23 allowed the government to retrieve 221 days of
CSLI information for both defendants without a warrant.24 The
statute also permits a governmental entity to collect non-content
information from an electronic communication service provider
pursuant to a court order, which requires only “specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe” that the communications are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.25 The SCA thus only requires that
there be reasonable facts that show that communications like CSLI
may be relevant to an investigation and does not require any showing
that a prudent person would believe that any evidence would be
found at the place of the search.26
Search warrants, however, require a higher standard—probable
cause27—which exists when “there are reasonably trustworthy facts
which, given the totality of the circumstances, are sufficient to lead a
prudent person to believe that the items sought constitute fruits,
instrumentalities, or evidence of crime and will be present at the time
and place of the search.”28 The elevated evidentiary standard for
probable cause is required whenever a police action constitutes a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment, which occurs when “an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable
is infringed.”29 Such a showing is a more difficult task than merely
drawing a connection of “relevancy” by reasonable facts to an
investigation, which is all that the SCA requires. Thus, the
government faces a lower bar to procure data like CSLI than it does
to acquire evidence with a search warrant.
After analyzing the government’s CSLI gathering under the SCA
during its first consideration of Graham, a three-judge panel at the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found the
apparent constitutionality of the SCA’s application to CSLI prior to the Fourth Circuit’s
ruling. Id. at 361–63.
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)–(d) (2012).
24. Graham, 796 F.3d at 338, 341.
25. § 2703(c)–(d).
26. See id.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”).
28. Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v.
Suarez, 906 F.2d 977, 984 (4th Cir. 1990)).
29. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
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access to CSLI information constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment.30 Since searches generate more stringent Fourth
Amendment protections, the panel reasoned, the SCA’s lower
standard for collecting CSLI was constitutionally insufficient—
instead, a warrant was needed.31 The panel’s holding was guided by its
concerns regarding the government’s ability to use CSLI to trace the
movements of an individual for a long period of time.32 In addition,
such aggregation and long-term tracking could lead to the discovery
of individuals’ private lives and personal habits, and the court felt that
cell phone users have a reasonable expectation that such private
matters will remain private and not be inspected by the government
without a warrant.33 Finally, the panel believed that the CSLI
information at issue was not voluntarily conveyed at all—the “mere
fact that the information [wound] up in the third party's records” was
not sufficient for voluntary conveyance by an individual.34 This
decision, however, did not go unchallenged.
After the Fourth Circuit’s initial ruling that the gathering of
CSLI constituted a search that required a warrant, the government
requested a rehearing en banc by the Fourth Circuit to fully consider
the Fourth Amendment question, which the court granted.35 The
Fourth Circuit subsequently upheld the conviction, but it established
that the collection of the data did not, in fact, violate the Fourth
Amendment, thus overturning the initial ruling.36 The court
recognized that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the
“government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as reasonable,” but this protection ends when information
is “voluntarily turned over to a third party.”37 It determined that the
CSLI was, in fact, “voluntarily” conveyed to a third party because of
defendants’ understanding that cell phone calls necessarily send out
location information38 and that the defendants had “assumed the risk”

30. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’d on other grounds,
824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
31. Id. (“Appellants argue that the government violated the Fourth Amendment in
seeking and inspecting the CSLI at issue here without a warrant based on probable cause.
We agree.”).
32. Id. at 345.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 353–55.
35. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 425, 427 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)).
38. Id. at 430.
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of the information being provided to the authorities.39 The court also
addressed the difference between content and non-content in
electronic communications but held that the CSLI was not
communications content, which has constitutional protections.40 It
stated that even though the CSLI could be “aggregated” to determine
the location of defendants over a long period of time, precedential
cases allowed the same sort of effect to pass constitutional muster,
and that the defendants attempted to “blur” the distinctions between
non-content and content with their arguments.41 With this holding,
the court essentially removed CSLI information from the protections
of the Fourth Amendment, meaning the government need only meet
the lower SCA evidentiary standard to gather such data in future
cases.
II. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE, THE CONTENT/NON-CONTENT
DISTINCTION, AND THE GRAHAM DECISION
Understanding why the Fourth Circuit dismissed Graham’s
arguments requires a brief look at the background and development
of the third-party doctrine and the content/non-content distinction. In
addition to this doctrinal overview, this Part concludes with an
examination of the unclear future of the third-party doctrine.
A. The Third-Party Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment
In 1967, the Supreme Court moved away from a strict textual
interpretation of the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment,
which focused on whether or not a “trespass” had occurred to a more
subjective, privacy-based test in Katz v. United States.42 This new
39. Id. at 427.
40. Id. at 433–34. The contents of various mediums of communications—including the
contents of letters and packages, telephone calls, and emails—are protected under the
Fourth Amendment, but non-content information, i.e., routing or address information, is
not. Id. at 433. The fact that contents are “sealed” in order to be “fully guarded from
examination and inspection . . . as if they were retained [by the communicator] in their
own domiciles” gives these contents Fourth Amendment protection. Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (holding that the contents of letters are protected by the Fourth
Amendment).
41. Graham, 824 F.3d at 433–34.
42. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Prior to Katz, the Supreme Court had followed a narrow
“trespass” doctrine that put only physical trespasses and seizures of material objects within
the purview of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 352–53; see also RICHARD M.
THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43586, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRDPARTY DOCTRINE 6 (2014). Prior to Katz, the Fourth Amendment was only understood
to protect “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Id.
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subjective test was articulated in a concurrence by Justice Harlan and
asked first whether a person had “exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, [whether] the expectation [was]
one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”43 However,
the Court also held that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”44
Applying this doctrine in a subsequent case, the Court held that a
warrant was not required to access bank checks and deposit slips, as
they were “not confidential communications” but were instead
“negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.”45
While these banking records may at first glance seem quite
confidential to consumers, the fact that these checks and slips still
consisted of information voluntarily conveyed to a third party
rendered them unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.46 Going even
further, the Court determined in a later case, Smith v. Maryland,47
that the use of a pen register—a device designed to register, record,
and disclose the numbers dialed on a phone48—did not constitute a
search and was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.49 The court
reasoned that the defendant had “no actual expectation of privacy in
the phone numbers he dialed” and that he had voluntarily conveyed
the numbers to the phone company, which lowered the expectation
he could have in the privacy of the numbers.50
Analogizing the CSLI at issue to bank records and phone
numbers, the Graham court found this data to be unprotected by the
Fourth Amendment because of the third-party doctrine, which meant
that no warrant was needed.51 Like the bank records conveyed in
Smith, the CSLI was voluntarily conveyed by the defendants, who
broadcast their locations through their texts and calls and thus took
the risk of this information’s recordation by a third party. The lack of
43. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Graham, 824 F.3d at 425
(applying the Katz expectation of privacy test).
44. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
45. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (“All of the documents
obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course
of business.”).
46. Id. at 442–43.
47. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
48. Id. at 741 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)).
49. See id. at 744–46.
50. See id. (using Miller as analysis to determine that the defendant voluntarily
conveyed numerical information to the telephone company through his dialing).
51. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
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Fourth Amendment protection for voluntarily conveyed information,
established in Miller and Smith, underpins the third-party doctrine at
issue in Graham and explains the court’s refusal to apply Fourth
Amendment protections to the data.
Another way to understand the Graham court’s refusal to
protect the CSLI is by exploring the lack of protections given to
“business records” under the third-party doctrine. The third-party
doctrine roughly includes two lines of cases.52 The first line (which is
not at issue here) pertains to information given to so-called “secret
agents,” who are undercover police agents or informants.53 The
second line, and the one through which cases like Graham have been
decided, fall within the “business record” line of cases, which find that
information voluntarily conveyed to another party in the ordinary
course of business have no Fourth Amendment protections.54 Both
the bank records in Miller and the data produced by the pen register
in Smith were found by the respective courts to be business records.55
This analysis has been extended to cases confronting CSLI data
gathering56 and can apply to any number of other entities that may
reasonably retain records about customers or subscribers.57 Under
this doctrine, people cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in information disclosed to a third party that are classified as business
records.58
An important distinction must be made between these business
records and confidential communications to other parties, however.
When a third party is an “intermediary,” or service that handles a
communication, the communication is not deemed to have been given
52. See Kerr, supra note 14, at 566.
53. See id. at 567–68. This line of cases essentially holds that statements made to
undercover officers or informants are not protected by the Fourth Amendment and do not
require any sort of warrant, as “one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk
that his companions may be reporting to police.” Id. at 568.
54. See id. at 569.
55. See id. at 569–70.
56. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016) (“This case
involves business records obtained from a third party, which can only diminish the
defendants’ expectation of privacy in the information those records contain.”), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017).
57. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 435 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(“Indeed, we expect that our banks, doctors, credit card companies, and countless other
third parties will record and keep information about our relationships with them, and will
do so for the entirety of those relationships—be it several weeks or many years . . . . This is
true even when, in the aggregate, these records reveal sensitive information similar to
what could be revealed by direct surveillance.”).
58. Kerr, supra note 14, at 563.
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over to a third party, and the government must have a warrant to
access the contents.59 “Simple business records,” however, and
information given to an intended recipient to be used “in the ordinary
course of business” do not have the same reasonable expectation of
privacy and may thus be obtained by the government without
probable cause and a warrant.60 This distinction is why business
records like CSLI may be gathered from a business without a warrant,
while the contents of letters, phone calls, and emails may not, even
though these communications travel through the business’s networks
or servers.
All told, these lines of reasoning and doctrines explain why,
when confronted with an issue regarding CSLI and Fourth
Amendment protections, the Graham court found that the acquisition
of CSLI from a cell-service provider did not require a warrant to be
gathered.
B.

The Content/Non-Content Distinction

A separate doctrine—the content/non-content doctrine—also
plays a role in Fourth Amendment protections, as seen in Graham.
The CSLI data in Graham was routing information that was deemed
mere non-content data and therefore does not receive the same
Fourth Amendment protections as the contents of other
communications.61 This content/non-content doctrine protects the
contents of communications from government surveillance without a
warrant and finds its roots in case law regarding letters.62 The sealed
nature of letters and similar packages makes the contents “‘as fully
guarded from examination and inspection’ as it would be if the party
mailing the letter had retained it in his or her own home.”63 The
sealed and confidential nature of such communications grants the
public a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in such communications,
even though the entrusting of the letter to an intermediary (i.e., the
post office) means that the letter or communication could be easily
accessed.64 This content doctrine has been expanded to digital
59. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
contents of emails have a reasonable expectation of privacy).
60. See id.
61. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 433–34
62. See Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2112 (2009).
63. Id. (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)).
64. See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285–86 (holding that the contents of emails are protected
by the Fourth Amendment).
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communications like emails,65 as well as non-text based
communications like phone calls.66 Non-content, however, may be
accessed by the government without a warrant.67 Non-content
includes phone numbers dialed by a party, the exteriors of packages
and letters, and routing information.68 Non-content is not protected
because there is no “actual expectation of privacy” for this
information because of the understanding that it is provided or visible
to a third party.69
The defendants in Graham attempted to argue that the CSLI
should have been treated as content instead of non-content by the
court, as CSLI “record[s] a person’s movements over a prolonged
period” and that this greater detail raises serious privacy concerns,
essentially transforming non-content into content.70 The negative
implications of these privacy concerns are summed up by Justice
Sotomayor in her United States v. Jones71 concurrence when she
questioned whether movements should be aggregated to the point
that the government could determine intimate details of the lives of
individuals, including political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and
much more.72 This aggregation argument made by the Graham
defendants closely mirrors a theory of Fourth Amendment analysis
known as the “Mosaic Theory.”73 This theory focuses on law
enforcement actions in their entirety, rather than looking at these
actions individually,74 and has been used as a rationale for Fourth
Amendment searches by at least one circuit court.75 However, the
court in Graham found that even though all routing information
records “potentially sensitive activity when aggregated” and that,
even though CSLI is “not identical to . . . other . . . routing
65. See id.
66. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013).
67. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 433 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
68. Id.
69. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (“All telephone users realize that
they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed.”). For a further
exploration of the content/non-content distinction in other areas of technological change,
see generally Tokson, supra note 62.
70. Graham, 824 F.3d at 433–34 (alteration in original).
71. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
72. See id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
73. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 311, 313 (2012).
74. Id.
75. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub
nom. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
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information,” it “blinks at reality” to argue that CSLI constitutes a
“communication of content.”76 Because the CSLI was made up of
routing information and contained no content, the court determined
the information to be non-content.77 However, although it is unlikely
that the content/non-content distinction will be eliminated, recent
legal events have cast doubt on the future of the Fourth Amendment
doctrines used by the Graham court, as well as the analyses and
applications of these doctrines.
C.

The Muddled Future of the Third-Party Doctrine

The future of the third-party doctrine has recently been called
into question, both in regard to its application to the gathering of
CSLI and to its future as a whole, by the recent decision of United
States v. Jones78 and the recent grant of certiorari by the Supreme
Court in Carpenter v. United States, a United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit case that also grappled with the Fourth
Amendment’s application to CSLI.79 Jones demonstrated that a
number of justices may be willing to reassess the third-party doctrine
if given the chance.80 Justice Sotomayor stated concerns about
whether people “reasonably expect” their movements to be recorded
to such a degree that the government could ascertain intimate details
about their lives, including “their political and religious beliefs, sexual
habits, and so on.”81 Justice Alito—speaking for three other
Justices—argued that long-term GPS government tracking
constituted a search and could thus not be gathered without a
warrant.82
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Carpenter, a case
remarkably similar to Graham, indicates that some sort of significant
change for the third-party doctrine may be on the horizon, especially
in light of the views expressed in Jones. The Carpenter court found a
number of defendants guilty of committing a string of armed
76. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 434 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
77. Id.
78. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). The Supreme Court unanimously held a GPS tracker on a
vehicle used to monitor a movement was “a search . . . within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 402.
79. 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017).
80. See THOMPSON II, supra note 42, at 21–22.
81. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
82. See id. at 430. (Alito, J., concurring) (“We need not identify . . . the point at which
the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4week mark.”).
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robberies throughout the Detroit area and featured the same sort of
warrantless gathering of CSLI information pursuant to the SCA to
pinpoint the defendants’ location near the scenes of the crimes.83 The
Sixth Circuit upheld the convictions on appeal and found that the
collection of CSLI was a collection of business records and therefore
not a search under the Fourth Amendment.84 The Supreme Court
granted this case certiorari and recently heard oral arguments.85
Justice Sotomayor, in her Jones concurrence, has already
expressed deep reservations about the third-party doctrine and its
applicability in the digital age,86 and Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and
Breyer joined Justice Alito’s opinion that expressed his own concerns
about long-term government surveillance in Jones.87 The CSLI
gathered in Carpenter was not gathered through any sort of
government surveillance, but the practical effect of the information
gathered still allowed law enforcement to create a map that showed
the defendants’ movements over nearly a six-month period.88 With
their concerns around steady, lengthy location surveillance,89 this
group of Justices may attempt to find a way to prevent CSLI
aggregation that essentially mirrors the GPS surveillance seen in
Jones. One other distinction the Carpenter circuit court drew between
the GPS in Jones and the CSLI before them was the relative lack of
accuracy and precision of CSLI versus GPS surveillance, with GPS
being accurate to within fifty feet while CSLI tracking could only
pinpoint a generalized area.90 To the court, this distinction was fatal to
the defendants’ arguments, and the court declined to speculate about
any future technologies.91 However, some of the Justices in
Carpenter’s oral arguments did speculate about future technologies
and the degree of precision that CSLI could achieve, with Justice
Kagan recognizing that technology had already progressed since the

83. Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884–85.
84. Id. at 890.
85. Transcript of Oral Argument, Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017)
(No. 16-402).
86. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
87. See id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
88. Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884–85.
89. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (“[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”).
90. See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 889.
91. See id.
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initial events of Carpenter to potentially allow tracking in a space half
the size of the Supreme Court’s courtroom.92
Other Justices, including newly appointed Justice Gorsuch,
attempted to explore more exotic alternatives during Carpenter’s oral
arguments,93 and many of the Justices further pressed the counsel for
the government about their concerns with long-term tracking.94
However, the Justices pressed the counsel for the petitioner just as
hard with their concerns about overturning precedent95 and on the
difficulties of creating a line or distinction to find government
tracking unconstitutional without a warrant,96 as well as the
distinction between location information and the business records in
Miller.97 All told, the Justices, respondents, and petitioners grappled
with many of the same issues and faced many of the same decisions
that the Graham court faced. The consequences of some of these
decisions—especially if the Supreme Court’s decision mirrors that of
Graham—as well as some potential solutions are the focus of the
remainder of this Recent Development.
III. CONSEQUENCES AND CRITICISMS OF GRAHAM
The Fourth Circuit claimed that the intention of the defendants
in Graham, when they argued that the aggregation of CSLI was
content, was to “blur this clear distinction” between content and noncontent, and asserted that “[c]onstitutional distinctions are made of
sturdier stuff” than that which was put forth by the defendants in
their arguments.98 However, the current constitutional distinction is
gravely lacking. As technology progresses, the line between noncontent and content is likely to grow ever more blurred. This
content/non-content distinction was created to guarantee the right of
people to be “secure in their papers . . . thus closed against inspection,

92. Transcript of Oral Argument at 72, Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211
(2017) (No. 16-402).
93. See id. at 51–52 (beginning a line of questioning in which Justice Gorsuch moved
away from the reasonable expectation of privacy approach and instead attempted to
explore with counsel for the respondent whether or not a defendant may hold a property
right in her location information).
94. See id. at 48, 66, 70 (providing the concerns of Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and
Kagan respectively).
95. See id. at 15 (questioning, by Justice Alito, about how much precedent the
petitioners want to overrule).
96. See id. at 7–15.
97. See id. at 4–6.
98. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 434 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
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wherever [the papers] may be.”99 Dismissing the defendants’
argument without any great consideration of the merits ignores the
importance of defendants’ interest in their effects and papers, be they
technological data or other types of personal information in which
parties have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Furthermore, this
could be potentially problematic for the future of Fourth Amendment
protections. A distinction that does not provide security to the
contents of communications and other sensitive information ignores
the very rationale behind the protections given to content in the first
place.
A. The Third-Party and Content Doctrines in the Twenty-First
Century
As the modern world becomes more technologically advanced
and interconnected, an ever-increasing amount of potential noncontent data will be produced by technological innovations that may
fall under the scope of the third-party doctrine.100 In his dissent in
Graham, Judge Wynn addressed this concern head-on by describing
several examples specific to cellular devices that could potentially
lead to far more precise location information.101 For example, tiny
“microcells”—cell sites small enough to coat roofs, interior flooring,
and other areas—as well as smartphone “pinging,” through which
smartphones are in almost continuous contact with cell towers
regarding their location, could all lead to instantaneous, precise
tracking of a defendant.102 In Judge Wynn’s view, this sort of precise
tracking would be allowed under the court’s ruling.103 He further
raised a concern about the scope, detail, and length of the tracking
enabled by the aggregation of CSLI.104
99. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
100. See generally If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth
Amendment Limits of the Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (2017)
(discussing the lack of Fourth Amendment protection of personal digital records shared
with third parties via home automation).
101. Graham, 824 F.3d at 448 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 448–49. Judge Wynn was concerned that the majority did “not decide . . .
that the CSLI employed here was too imprecise or too discontinuous to infringe
Defendant’s privacy,” which he believed would allow incredibly precise and continued
tracking under new technologies under the court’s ruling. Id.
104. See id. at 447. This long-term tracking also brings to mind the GPS tracking in
Jones which concerned Justice Alito, who claimed that four weeks of GPS tracking of a
vehicle was a search. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring). But see Graham, 824 F.3d at 435 (“But Jones involved government
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Other circuit court judges have expressed similar concerns. For
example, Judge Martin’s dissent in United States v. Davis,105 a case
from the Eleventh Circuit, supports Judge Wynn’s argument and
described the extensive amount of information that Google (as well
as Facebook, Amazon, and other sites) gathers. This information
includes websites visited, personal and financial information, the
specific type of electronic devices used by individuals (i.e., whether a
person was using their smartphone or laptop), and one’s actual
location. The dissent highlighted the fact that, under the third-party
doctrine, all of this data could be gathered by the government without
a warrant.106 But that is not the end of the problem.
The biggest concerns regarding non-content data do not arise
from what information law enforcement can access now, but rather
what they will be able to access in the very near future. “[C]onnected
TVs, refrigerators, appliances, [and] home automation systems”
already exist.107 Smart mattresses that monitor sleep patterns and
share this data with your phone have been developed, as have smart
cars that will be connected to cellular companies’ networks.108
Perhaps most intimate, however, is the range of health trackers, from
the already-used Fitbit fitness tracker to devices like personal EKG
monitors, to glucose monitoring systems that can send detailed tenday analyses of one’s health patterns to doctors.109 While the precise
readings and contents of any messages created by these devices would
be protected, other information shared with third parties from these
devices could, under the Graham court’s test, be discovered by police
without a warrant if they were found to be “voluntarily conveyed.”110
All of this could be aggregated to paint an intimately detailed portrait
of a person’s life. In other words, while the contents of any messages
created by these devices may be protected, the aggregation of any
non-content data and messages over time could essentially render the
protections provided to the contents of communications moot. The

surveillance of an individual, not an individual’s voluntary disclosure of information to a
third party.”).
105. 785 F.3d 498, 533–45 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 534; see also In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 623
(4th Cir. 2013) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (providing further examples of concerns).
107. Tim Bajarin, The Next Big Thing for Tech: The Internet of Everything, TIME (Jan.
13, 2014), http://time.com/539/the-next-big-thing-for-tech-the-internet-of-everything/
[https://perma.cc/8YSC-HMQZ].
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
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access to the contents of messages requires probable cause so as to
prevent the sealed and guarded contents of those letters from being
accessed by the government;111 allowing an aggregation of noncontent data to the point that contents can essentially be read,
guessed, or easily determined circumvents these protections. To so
easily overcome these protections goes against the spirit and purpose
of the Fourth Amendment.
For instance, consider a theoretical health device worn on the
wrist that is capable of reading a number of vital health indicators.112
The benefit of this device is that it automatically sends an alert to any
number and type of a large list of doctors regarding changes in the
wearer’s vital signs, allowing the doctors to immediately determine if
the wearer needs medical treatment, what type of medical treatment,
and the severity of the situation. Imagine that this device has quickly
become ubiquitous in modern society due to its ability to recognize
strokes, heart attacks, the onset of seizures for epileptics, and changes
in blood sugar in diabetics, as well as its general day-to-day usage by
the population as a fitness and health tracker. The company that
produces these devices also produces specialty versions of the device,
such as one that tracks important health statistics in pregnant mothers
and sends daily reports to the mother’s OB/GYN to monitor the
pregnancy’s progress and the health of the fetus. The company does
not have access to the health readings themselves but does choose to
keep logs of which wearer sends messages to which doctors in order
to run diagnostics on its network and keep track of the effectiveness
of the system. The company pledges to its customers that no contents
of any alert or message to any healthcare provider can be accessed,
stored, or retained by the company in any way.113
111. See supra Section II.B.
112. While the device provided in this hypothetical does not currently exist and was
created by the author to illustrate the third-party doctrine and content/non-content
distinctions, some of these technologies currently exist and are in use today. See, e.g.,
Bertalan Mesko, Top 10 Healthcare Wearables for a Healthy Lifestyle, THE MED.
FUTURIST, http://medicalfuturist.com/top-healthcare-wearables/ [https://perma.cc/CB9PV4PX].
113. Whether or not HIPAA would cover the data tracked by such a device would
largely depend upon whether or not the device’s manufacturer is a “covered entity” or
not. See Kristen Lee, Wearable Health Technology and HIPAA: What Is and Isn’t Covered,
TECHTARGET (July 2015), http://searchhealthit.techtarget.com/feature/Wearable-healthtechnology-and-HIPAA-What-is-and-isnt-covered [https://perma.cc/8SVA-VQH7]. Under
this rule, commercially purchased devices would usually not fall under HIPAA, while
devices provided by a health care provider, doctor, or other similar entity would. See id.
Regardless, HIPAA has separate disclosure rules that allow law enforcement to procure
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However, such a device could still be used by the government to
gather an intimate and exhaustive picture of one’s health. The
communications logs kept by the company are analogous to the
location information kept by the cell phone companies in Graham
and the phone numbers dialed in Miller because they are considered
“addressing” and “routing” information.114 Furthermore, the statute
that allowed the police to acquire CSLI in Graham,115 the SCA, could
be used to acquire this information, as the SCA allows the
government to access records of a customer from an electronic
communication service.116 The information gathered by the
government through this method would only be the routing
information between the device’s wearer and her doctors and would
not include the contents of the messages (in this case, the exact
readings of the device), but even this routing information could
provide the government with an intimate look into the life of the
wearer after its aggregation. For instance, continuous
communications between a wearer and an OB/GYN could make it
possible to determine that one is either pregnant or considering
pregnancy, while a sudden flurry of messages towards surgeons and
cardiologists could signify a heart problem or an array of other
significant ailments that a wearer may wish to keep private. While
such clues and aggregations may not be completely accurate or as
telling as the actual content of any message would be, enough data
points could still reach a point where the government has little doubt
about the meaning behind the communications. All of these
individual data points could, in the aggregate, provide the
government with an intimate look into the personal health and well-

certain personal information during investigations. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2017)
(describing the requirements for disclosure of medical information to law enforcement,
including personal information “in response to a law enforcement official’s request for
such information for the purpose of identifying or locating a suspect”).
114. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 433 (“The Supreme Court has thus forged a clear
distinction between the contents of communications and the non-content information . . . .
CSLI, which identifies the equipment used to route calls and texts, undeniably belongs in
the non-content category.”).
115. See id. at 426.
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require a provider of
electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a record or
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including
the content of communications).”). An “electronic communication service” is defined
elsewhere in the statute as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send
or receive wire or electronic communications.” § 2510(15).
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being of any party using these devices without any Fourth
Amendment barriers.
An example like this runs into a clear counterargument that asks
whether or not data of this type is even relevant to police surveillance
and the Fourth Amendment. However, any such relevance would not
have to be significant—law enforcement would only have to provide
“specific and articulable” facts that the data is relevant to an ongoing
case to pull the data from this device,117 meaning the bar for access to
the information would not be high if law enforcement were to find
any reason to collect the data. In any event, this scenario still provides
a framework for how such modern devices could be accessed by law
enforcement without meeting the threshold of probable cause.
Furthermore, the same sort of analysis could work for any variety of
different devices, from pinging GPS devices installed in cars to
devices that track IP addresses.118 In the era when a folded map
functioned as one’s global positioning system and letters and rotary
phones were the primary means of contacting others, the costs of
aggregation—of gathering sufficient data to craft a mosaic of a
person’s life—were steep, inconvenient, and time-consuming. Now,
however, modern technology makes the creation of a multi-faceted
portrait far simpler.
B.

Keeping the Current Doctrine Has Consequences, but so Too
Does Change

Proponents of the third-party doctrine and detractors of
concerns about aggregation may claim that data of this nature
falls clearly under the third-party doctrine and, while intimate
possibly concerning, the data is still composed of non-content
thus cannot require a warrant.119 Under the very broad lines

the
still
and
and
laid

117. See § 2703(d) (“A court order . . . shall issue only if the governmental entity offers
specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”).
118. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that
using a device that tracked the IP addresses typed and accessed by a defendant was
“constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register that the Court approved
in Smith” and that the action of tracking IP addresses thus did not require a warrant).
119. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 433 (“CSLI is non-content information because ‘cell-site
data—like mailing addresses, phone numbers, and IP addresses—are information that
facilitate personal communications, rather than part of the content of those
communications themselves.’” (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887–88
(6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017))).
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down in Graham, they would be correct,120 as the Fourth Circuit
believes that people today “expect that . . . countless other third
parties” will retain information about them that may not remain
secret.121 Proponents of the third-party doctrine have argued that it
provides clarity and a test that is easy to apply and have pointed to
the fact that an alternative has not been easily created as evidence of
the doctrine’s validity.122 They also argue that due to the rapidly
evolving pace of technology, a doctrine that attempts to draw a line
after aggregation is untenable.123
An additional difficulty revolves around the practical application
of any aggregate or mosaic theory.124 Proposing that judges apply
complex constitutional tests to determine whether or not the Fourth
Amendment has been violated may only place a heavy burden onto
judges, who must then try to make sense of complex constitutional
doctrines and factual situations without a clear test or line.125 Bright
line tests like the third-party doctrine are easy to administer: if the
information has been given to a third party, it is unprotected. This test
is simple to use, predictable in result, and does not impose a heavy
burden on judges to determine the constitutionality of an action.
However, clarity, simplicity, and ease of application do not guarantee
a doctrine’s faithfulness to the Constitution. The protections provided
by the Fourth Amendment should be the keystone for any doctrine,
not the simplicity of application.
The current doctrine may be simple to apply, but it ignores
growing practical modern realities. The Fourth Circuit and other
courts have found that an individual has no actual expectation of
privacy when she “voluntarily conveys” information like CSLI,126
phone numbers,127 or IP addresses,128 even when she does not
recognize that she is actively conveying this information to a third
party.129 According to the Fourth Circuit, this is true even when “in
the aggregate, these records reveal sensitive information similar to

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See id. at 432.
Id. at 435.
See Kerr, supra note 14, at 581.
See Kerr, supra note 73, at 347–48.
See id. at 346–47.
See id.
See Graham, 824 F.3d at 430.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
See Graham, 824 F.3d at 432.
See id. at 430.
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what could be revealed by direct surveillance.”130 The constitutional
protections that require the government to acquire a warrant to
access “communications content” (such as the contents of sealed mail
or emails) still exist,131 but the fact remains that these protections
become ineffective if the government can use unprotected noncontent information to essentially determine what the protected
communication may say. In Graham, for instance, the government
has already shown an ability to closely track a defendant using CSLI
alone.132
An acceptance of this concept ignores Justice Sotomayor’s
concerns in her Jones concurrence regarding the government painting
a precise picture of one’s life, including their “political and religious
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”133 It also ignores Justice Alito’s
concern about the rapid decline of what was once one of the most
significant protections of privacy from government surveillance: the
technological capabilities of the government itself.134 Months-long
surveillance efforts would once have taken massive police resources
and would be reserved for only the most significant crimes; now,
however, the government can use CSLI and other data to essentially
track a defendant for weeks without spending significant resources,
greatly expanding the ability of the government to track citizens.135
The long-held societal expectation that “law enforcement agents and
others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an
individual’s car for a very long period” in this manner was a key
rationale for Justice Alito when he held that continuous government
surveillance for four weeks without a warrant was unconstitutional
under the Katz test.136 Courts have correctly held that Jones only
places these restrictions on long-term government surveillance and
tracking,137 but this distinction provides little solace for defendants.
Creating a detailed account of one’s life from data taken from a
GPS installed by police versus information taken from a phone
130. Id. at 435.
131. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013).
132. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 447 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
133. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
134. See id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Traditional surveillance for any extended
period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.”).
135. See id.
136. Id. at 430–31.
137. See Graham, 824 F.3d. at 435 (“But Jones involved government surveillance of an
individual, not an individual’s voluntary disclosure of information to a third party.”).
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company seems like a small distinction, but according to current
doctrine, it is sufficiently different for defendants to entirely
surrender their actual expectation that their every move not be
followed.138 The fact that this small difference in action creates such a
vast difference in expectations of privacy and in doctrinal results
presses the boundaries of reasonableness. With a rise in information
transmitted to third parties by technological devices, the government
may be able to find out far more about a person than it once could
have with a warrant. The Graham court worried about blurring the
line between content and non-content and approved of a clear
distinction,139 but at some point this non-content, when aggregated,
could potentially tell just as much—if not more—than content ever
could, as demonstrated by the health device hypothetical given above.
At that point, there may be no distinction between content and noncontent at all.
Regardless of whether or not the information collected by all of
these sources falls under the traditional third-party doctrine, the end
effect may be an erosion of Fourth Amendment protections. As
established in Katz, the Fourth Amendment provides protections
when persons have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy” and when that expectation is one that “society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”140 However, if all information given to
third parties, even unknowingly, is considered to be “voluntarily
conveyed,” where does one’s actual and reasonable expectation of
privacy end and begin? The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Graham (as
well as those similar decisions in other circuits), and the aggregation
of non-content that it allows, could paint such a detailed picture of a
potential defendant’s life that one’s “persons, houses, papers, and
effects”141 could be laid bare for the government, all without a
warrant. Regardless of whether or not this information is voluntarily
conveyed, it would be a return to the days of unlimited government
searches142 to allow this to continue unchecked.
138. See id. at 433; United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 514 (11th Cir. 2015).
139. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 433 n.12 (“[T]he content/non-content distinction makes
good doctrinal sense. The intended recipient of the content of communication is not the
third party who transmits it, but the person [who is] called . . . . The routing and addressing
information, by contrast, is intended for the third parties who facilitate such
transmissions.”).
140. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
141. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
142. See THOMPSON II, supra note 42, at 3–4. Thompson laid out the history behind the
passage of the Fourth Amendment, describing “indiscriminate government intrusions” by
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IV. A POSSIBLE LEGAL RESPONSE MOVING FORWARD
Finding a response to these changing circumstances is
contentious143 and resists a simple test.144 However, to ignore the
problem would be an improper response. Instead, the best way
forward is likely that option touched upon by Justice Sotomayor in
Jones when she asked “whether people reasonably expect that their
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables
the government to ascertain . . . their political and religious beliefs,
sexual habits, and so on.”145 People may have an expectation that
seemingly insignificant individual data points, such as the numbers
they call, will be recorded or monitored, but aggregating these data
points to create an intricate description of one’s life that essentially
circumvents the content protections is surely not “reasonable.”
However, these aggregations are allowed under the current case law,
including Graham and Carpenter. Thus, a change is needed to truly
protect individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights.
A. A Proposed Test: Does One Have a “Reasonable Assumption” of
Privacy?
This Recent Development suggests that courts adopt a rule that
allows non-content to still be acquired without a warrant but not to a
point that the non-content could be aggregated into a picture which,
for all intents and purposes, conveys what the contents of messages
would have. Such an aggregation approach has already been
attempted by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Maynard,146 the
circuit court decision that eventually became the Supreme Court case
United States v. Jones. The D.C. Circuit held that the aggregated
movements of the defendant required a warrant.147 All told, the
the British into private homes that led to “fear of unrestrained government power” and to
the eventual passage of the Fourth Amendment in response. Id.
143. See, e.g., Graham, 824 F.3d at 441–50 (Wynn, J., dissenting); United States v.
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 533–45 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting); In re U.S. for
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615–32 (4th Cir. 2013) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
144. See the lack of a unified test in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–31 (2012)
(establishing a traditional “trespass” test via Justice Scalia, a Katz reasonableness test with
a concern for aggregation by Justice Sotomayor, and a traditional reasonableness test by
Justice Alito).
145. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
146. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400 (2012).
147. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556–58. The D.C. Circuit found that the most significant
factor in whether a party has a reasonable expectation of privacy for information is
whether that information “has been exposed to the public.” Id. at 558. Furthermore, what
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defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Katz
test, and the “prolonged GPS monitoring reveal[ed] [such] an
intimate picture of the subject’s life” that the court found the
monitoring to be a search.148 This aggregation approach, subsequently
dubbed the “Mosaic Theory,” analyzes police actions as a collective
instead of individually.149 If the actions taken by police reach the level
of a Fourth Amendment search as an entirety, a warrant is needed,
even if each of the individual actions would not have independently
required a warrant.150 This approach shows how such an aggregation
approach may work and serves as evidence that some courts are
currently responsive to the idea.
This Recent Development’s proposed test incorporates the idea
of aggregation that concerned Justice Sotomayor in Jones151 and the
D.C. Circuit in Maynard,152 and it will be called the “reasonable
assumption” test. The foundation for this test finds its roots in Justice
Marshall’s dissent in Smith, in which he argued that “[p]rivacy is not a
discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who
disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited
purpose need not assume that this information will be released to
other persons for other purposes.”153 Parties who provide their
location by making a phone call should reasonably know that their
information may be used to locate them at the location of the call.
This fact has been well established and developed by the courts154 and
should allow this immediate-location data to still be accessible by the
police under both the third-party and non-content doctrines.
However, courts should recognize that customers who provide their
location for a phone call have a reasonable assumption that their
phone calls will not eventually be used and aggregated by the police
to intimately track their movements over a long period of time. While
the police discovered—the month-long movements and location discussed in Jones—was
not exposed to the public, as the “whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is
[neither] actually exposed” nor “constructively” exposed, even though each individual
movement was, in fact, exposed. Id.
148. Id. at 563.
149. Kerr, supra note 73, at 313. For more background and general analysis into the
Mosaic Theory, as well as an ultimate rejection by Professor Kerr, see generally id.
150. Id. at 336–40.
151. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
152. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556–58.
153. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 430 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(discussing both the facts at hand, as well as other cases that held that parties understand
their exposing of location through phone calls).
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there may be a reasonable expectation that such a thing could be
done, they would also have a reasonable assumption that such a thing
would not be done because of their constitutional right to be “secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” against unreasonable
searches155 and because of the vastly different and more intimate
picture that such an aggregation paints, as compared to a single data
point. Thus, the dividing line between a gathering of non-content
given to third parties and an unconstitutional search or intrusion into
what is essentially the “contents” of messages would be what the
subjective person would reasonably assume the original information
would be used to show.
This approach is different—and more flexible—than the current
all-or-nothing approach used by courts like the Fourth Circuit. In
Graham, the court stated that “an individual can claim ‘no legitimate
expectation of privacy’ in information that he has voluntarily turned
over to a third party.”156 This is because, “by ‘revealing his affairs to
another,’ an individual ‘takes the risk . . . that the information will be
conveyed by that person to the Government.’”157 The line here is
clear: if you keep information to yourself, it is protected, but once you
reveal it to another, you take on all risks of this information being
acquired by the government. Under the reasonable assumption test,
however, this revealing of data will not be the end of the inquiry.
Instead, a court will have to ask what the person who provided the
data would reasonably assume this data would be used for. Thus,
instead of making all revealed data free from all protections, the
Fourth Amendment will cover unreasonable uses of this data, with
this “reasonable” analysis happening on a factual case-by-case basis.
B.

Factors to Consider for a “Reasonable Assumption” Test

A number of factors could be created in order to determine how
reasonable a person’s assumption would be that information would
not be used by law enforcement without probable cause and a
warrant. First, a court could look at how sensitive the revealed
information is. Information given to lending institutions and to health
care providers invokes more concern about being revealed than does
information spoken to a companion on a crowded train.158 In
155. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
156. Graham, 824 F.3d at 427 (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44).
157. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
158. Information given to lending institutions is covered by a federal statute that bars
the disclosure of any “nonpublic personal information” without providing notice to the
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comparison, CSLI is arguably not extremely sensitive standing on its
own. A single data point merely shows a person’s location at a given
moment, which could easily be in a public place that would otherwise
have few reasonable assumptions of privacy.
Second, a court could look to the complexity of the data itself
before any aggregation. For this factor, the less complex the data, the
more reasonably a person may assume that this data will not be used
by law enforcement against them. For instance, having a conversation
with or giving a map to a police informant has no protections under
either the current third-party doctrine or this test, as a defendant has
no reasonable assumption that a drawn map will not be used to
determine her whereabouts during a crime. These complex sets of
data are enough to stand on their own and require no aggregation by
the government. A person has, however, a reasonable assumption
that a single data point of CSLI will not be used to map out their
whereabouts, as this data point is far from complete enough to be
used as a GPS substitute and requires aggregation to get to this point.
For instance, a consumer swiping a credit card at a store has a
reasonable assumption that this data point will not be used as a
collective to determine all of her shopping habits. A phone caller,
furthermore, has a reasonable assumption that her phone call will not
be used to track her whereabouts for months. Essentially, a person
has a reasonable assumption that such singular actions will not be
used to track far beyond the scope of those actions159—thus creating
an element that addresses some of the concerns about the aggregation
of non-content raised above.

consumer prior to the disclosure. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a) (2012). This personal
information includes any identifying information provided to the financial institution by
the consumer that results from any transaction or was otherwise acquired by the
institution. See § 6809(4)(A). Health information is also covered under specialized security
and privacy rules that limits disclosure of personal information to third parties. See 45
C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2018) (“A covered entity or business associate may not use or
disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required by [various Sections
and Subparts of the Chapter].”).
159. Discussing whether or not people should have a reasonable assumption that they
will not be subject to long-term surveillance raises policy arguments about the desirability
of government surveillance, privacy, and security that are beyond the scope of this Recent
Development. Tellingly, however, almost sixty percent of Americans find government’s
monitoring of communications of American citizens to be “unacceptable.” See Lee Raine,
The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-in-america/ [https://perma.cc
/QNW7-JVKW].
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It is to be noted that this factor does not protect simple, singular
data points from discovery by the government. Instead, this factor
must be considered in tandem with what the government is
attempting to use the data for. If the data is being used for a
“reasonable” purpose—to determine one’s location during a singular
phone call, or to determine what store a consumer was in at the time
of a crime—these single data points are unprotected, as people
arguably cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in these
singular, public actions. It is only when these singular actions are used
to paint larger, unrelated pictures that they begin to become outside
the realm of reasonable assumptions.
Finally, a court could perhaps look at the technological ease of
the acquired data at the time of collection versus law enforcement’s
historical abilities to gather information. This will address Justice
Alito’s concerns about how investigations that used to take weeks and
require significant resources and manpower can now be accomplished
with devices as small, cheap, and innocuous as GPS trackers.160 More
weight will likely have to go on the first two factors, as a defendant
likely will reasonably assume that technological advancements will be
brought to bear against them in an investigation, but considering this
can act as a brake on the impacts of swift technological changes on
Fourth Amendment doctrines. Additional factors may be useful and
necessary for this doctrine to be fully viable, but these will provide a
starting point for the reasonable assumption test.
Applied to CSLI gathering, this test would both protect the
ability of the police to do their jobs while also protecting against
widespread and lengthy tracking by the government. Police could still
use CSLI for individual suspects, just over a much more limited
length of time, to determine whether or not a party was in the area.
No explicit time limit would be mandated by this reasonable
assumption test; instead, the amount of time allowed would arise
from the factors in the test and the underlying data. A few singular
data points of highly sensitive financial interactions, for instance,
would lead to a shorter reasonable time for surveillance and
aggregation, as a user arguably has more of a reasonable assumption
that sensitive banking actions will be kept private. Letter addressing
information and CSLI may have a longer reasonable time of

160. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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observation, as they are more public than these banking records.161
However, the government could still not gather significant portions of
this CSLI (and other similar non-content) and aggregate it to a point
beyond what a person would reasonably assume that information
would be used for (i.e., to essentially show what the “contents” of a
message would or to show detailed, long-term tracking). This would
protect against the concerns raised by Justices Sotomayor and Alito
in Jones, and would provide a constitutional limit on the aggregation
of both business records and non-content. This approach would also
shift away from the all-or-nothing approach to privacy that concerned
Justice Marshall in Smith,162 and would approach the subject with
more nuance by recognizing that people may have expectations of
privacy from the government even when they do interact with third
parties. This reasonable assumption would have to still allow creative
uses by law enforcement,163 but even limiting the reasonable
assumption test to just aggregation would provide privacy and
security to citizens that the current doctrines do not. This test could
be adapted to any number of other areas that involve information
revealed to third parties through the third-party doctrine or to other
non-content information. To avoid over-complicating the doctrine
and to protect against future technological developments, this test
would cover the aggregation of all such information without regard
for that information’s sensitivity.

161. As noted above, the Supreme Court in Jones declined to draw an exact line of
when tracking by the government rises to the level of a search, only finding that four
weeks was over that unknown line. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. While the
factor-driven analysis of the proposed reasonable assumption test may prove to be an
imperfect methodology by which to establish the exact moment in time at which a
government action becomes a search, such a factor-driven analysis alleviates the need for
the creation of a hard doctrinal line, which can be difficult to articulate. The difficulties
with articulating a bright line for when a police action—specifically police tracking—
becomes a search was evident in Carpenter’s oral arguments, during which counsel for
Carpenter struggled to defend his proposed line of twenty-four hours. See Transcript of
Oral Argument at 7–15, Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (No. 16-402).
162. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
163. For instance, law enforcement could still make reasonable inferences based on
individual data points and could use these individual data points under the third-party and
non-content doctrines to carry out investigations. Just because a single data point—i.e., the
location from a single phone call—would not be expected to reveal incriminating evidence
would not prevent the police from using it in that manner.
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Counterarguments to the Proposed Reasonable Assumptions Test

There are certainly criticisms and weaknesses of this test, as
there likely will be with any solution to the challenges brought by the
interaction of technology and the Fourth Amendment. First, this test
still places the burden on individual courts and judges to make
difficult, fact-based decisions, which was one of the significant
concerns about using the Mosaic Theory for the aggregation of
data.164 However, the inquiry for judges will be different under this
approach. Instead of looking at aggregated data to attempt to draw a
line for every search, a judge will merely look to see whether or not
the aggregated data is being used in a way that is different than how a
reasonable person would reasonably assume this data would be used.
Instead of trying to draw lines in shifting sands, judges would just
have to carry out a reasonableness test.
One of the more significant criticisms is that this approach would
make life harder on law enforcement.165 This is unfortunately true, as
the test would protect data from police discovery without a warrant
that they can currently access without probable cause. On the other
hand, the Fourth Amendment exists for the protection of the people
to be secure in their papers and effects, not to make law enforcement
easy. This may limit creative detective work that uses the aggregation
of seemingly insignificant data points to create a picture of a potential
threat to society. However, the chilling effect claimed by detractors is
likely not as intense as claimed. For instance, a potential defendant
has a reasonable assumption that a single IP address of an extremist
website that he visits will be noticed.166 He has a reasonable
assumption that his call to a criminal organization will be noticed, and
a reasonable assumption that law enforcement will spot his departure
from a business commonly known as a front for a criminal enterprise.
He does not, however, have a reasonable assumption that all of these
data points will be used in combination to paint him a criminal, but at
164. See Kerr, supra note 73, at 346–47.
165. See Kerr, supra note 14, at 575–77. In Professor Kerr’s vision, a world without the
third-party doctrine would allow criminal parties to remain at home in a “bubble of Fourth
Amendment protection,” thus planning their crimes through channels—such as internet
searches and phone calls—that police could not access. See id. at 576. Essentially, criminals
could remain at home and work through remote agents and never be subject to
observation because of a lack of third-party doctrine. See id. at 575.
166. See, e.g., Olivia Solon, Google’s Ad Tracking is as Creepy as Facebook’s. Here’s
How to Disable It, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2016, 6:48 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2016/oct/21/how-to-disable-google-ad-tracking-gmail-youtube-browser-history
[https://perma.cc/N8MV-55UY].
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this point a prudent person would almost certainly believe that
evidence of a crime may be found in this person’s home, on his phone,
or on his person—thus, probable cause has been met, and a resulting
warrant can allow law enforcement to gather all of the information it
needs.
D. Impact on the Current Third-Party Doctrine and Content/NonContent Distinction
While this rule would overturn established precedent that finds
no expectation of privacy in voluntarily conveyed information,167 it
would not entirely overthrow the current doctrine.168 A rule of this
sort would protect against what society is most likely to find
unreasonable—the aggregation of data into a detailed picture of a
defendant’s life that would allow the government to essentially
establish guilt without ever seeking a warrant.169 This aggregation
would certainly make life simpler for the government to find and stop
criminals, which is of course a worthy goal in and of itself. However,
with any government power comes the potential for abuse, and
granting the government the power to gather limitless non-content
and third-party data could, when combined with the revealing effects
of aggregation, essentially create a system of continuous and invasive
government surveillance.170 The Fourth Circuit may have sought a
“sturdier” constitutional distinction171 than what is proposed here, but
the fact of the matter is that a line must be drawn somewhere before
modern technology further undermines Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Whether this means the adoption of the reasonable
assumption test or some other restriction of the scope of data
gathering or its aggregation could be a question for the courts or

167. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (applying
the Smith third-party doctrine).
168. See id. at 433 (describing how content of messages is protected, but non-content is
not).
169. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
170. For a pertinent discussion of the interaction between the Fourth Amendment and
the NSA’s large-scale metadata surveillance program, see generally Joseph D. Mornin,
NSA Metadata Collection and the Fourth Amendment, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 985
(2014).
171. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 434 (stating how, under the defendant’s argument, phone
numbers dialed, dates and times of the call, and the source of the call would all be
unprotected, while the cell towers used would be, and how “[c]onstitutional distinctions
are made of sturdier stuff”).
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Congress, who, as the Fourth Circuit discusses, plays a large role in
this process as well.172 Either way, some sort of action is needed.
One final consideration is that the Graham verdict did not turn
on the cell phone data at all—there was already other evidentiary
information that connected the defendants to the crime scene that
had been gathered under a warrant before the acquisition of the CSLI
from the cell phone company, including clothing that matched clothes
worn at the crime scene.173 This is a key point, as increasing the
evidentiary standard to probable cause for aggregation of noncontent would not withhold evidence of crimes from the authorities
entirely. Instead, it would merely protect the aggregated data until
the government could show “probable cause,” which is what the
Constitution requires.174 Furthermore, this is a standard that the
police in Graham and Carpenter would likely have met through other
police work.175 For example, the police in Graham had gathered
information and other evidence through search warrants—in
particular, clothes found in the defendants’ homes that matched those
worn by the robbers at the crime scene176—that would have likely
made a reasonable person believe that evidence of a crime (i.e., the
location of the criminals near the crime scene) would be located in
the CSLI. Until the point that law enforcement has gathered enough
of such information for probable cause, however, people should be
able to rest assured that their non-content data and information will
not be so aggregated that the government will be able to clearly see
the most intimate details of their lives, be that their long-term
location, their health, or any number of other sensitive details.

172. Id. at 440 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]hroughout our history . . . it
has been Congress that has taken the lead in . . . balanc[ing] the need for a new
investigatory technique against the undesirable consequences of any intrusion on
constitutionally protected interests in privacy.” (alterations in original) (quoting Dalia v.
United States, 441 U.S. 238, 264 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). Despite this note in the
Graham concurrence that legislative solutions are often used to resolve conflicts between
new techniques and constitutional interests, it is quite possible that the Supreme Court will
be the source of a new test or focus when Carpenter is decided in 2018.
173. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 340–41 (2015), aff’d on other grounds,
824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
174. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing . . . the persons or things to
be seized.”).
175. See Graham, 796 F.3d at 340–41. In Carpenter, police based their court orders off
of a given confession by one of those involved in the robbery. See United States v.
Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017).
176. Graham, 796 F.3d at 340.
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CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit in Graham itself expressed a reservation for
the doctrine it was upholding and broadening, saying that if it had a
“clean slate,” it might protect these large quantities of information,177
but that it was bound by Supreme Court precedent.178 These
reservations are further evidence not to avoid the problems posed by
the aggregation of this data to record sensitive information about
individuals over time. The Fourth Circuit made a mistake when it
quickly dismissed CSLI as non-content without addressing the great
concerns that arise from its aggregation.179 The court argued that
society has no expectation of privacy when third parties maintain
records, even when that data may be aggregated so as to reveal
sensitive information similar to that of pervasive government
surveillance.180 However, this will be no small comfort to private
citizens when the government can, without a warrant, look through all
of the data gathered by the multitudes of third-party actors who will
have access to their lives to build an intimate, detailed picture of one’s
health, travels, finances, sleep schedules, contacts, internet history,
and purchases.181 At this point, once again, the question must be
asked: would the government even need a warrant?
The answer to this disquieting question should be an unequivocal
yes. There will certainly be potential difficulties in the application of a
reasonable assumptions test, both in application and in the change in
precedent such a new test would create. However, courts should
nevertheless hold that all of this non-content data, be it CSLI, health
data, or messages from one’s smart refrigerator,182 cannot be
aggregated so as to approach a level of intimacy similar to that which
would be acquired by the acquisition of the contents of private
communications and that goes beyond the reasonable assumption
regarding the way such data will be used. This will not forbid the
government from ever accessing this information; instead, it will
merely provide for the reasonable protection of society’s
177. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
178. See id. at 437–38.
179. See id. at 434.
180. See id. at 435 (distinguishing Jones as one of impermissible government tracking
versus that of third party record-keeping in Graham).
181. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 536 (Martin, J., dissenting) (describing
the multitude of ways that third-party actors such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon
could acquire potentially discoverable information); Bajarin, supra note 107.
182. Family Hub Refrigerator, SAMSUNG.COM, http://www.samsung.com/us/explore
/family-hub-refrigerator/ [https://perma.cc/FHV3-YJ5U].
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constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment, and it will give
courts and citizens a reasonable test to use moving forward into an
ever more closely connected future.
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